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Abstract
Mobile application security has been one of the
major areas of security research in the last decade.
Numerous application analysis tools have been
proposed in response to malicious, curious, or vul-
nerable apps. However, existing tools, and specif-
ically, static analysis tools, trade soundness of the
analysis for precision and performance, and are
hence soundy. Unfortunately, the specific unsound
choices or flaws in the design of these tools are often
not known or well-documented, leading to a mis-
placed confidence among researchers, developers,
and users. This paper proposes the Mutation-based
soundness evaluation (µSE) framework, which sys-
tematically evaluates Android static analysis tools
to discover, document, and fix, flaws, by leverag-
ing the well-founded practice of mutation analy-
sis. We implement µSE as a semi-automated frame-
work, and apply it to a set of prominent Android
static analysis tools that detect private data leaks in
apps. As the result of an in-depth analysis of one
of the major tools, we discover 13 undocumented
flaws. More importantly, we discover that all 13
flaws propagate to tools that inherit the flawed tool.
We successfully fix one of the flaws in coopera-
tion with the tool developers. Our results motivate
the urgent need for systematic discovery and docu-
mentation of unsound choices in soundy tools, and
demonstrate the opportunities in leveraging muta-
tion testing in achieving this goal.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
have become the fabric of our consumer comput-
ing ecosystem; by the year 2020, more than 80% of
the world’s adult population is projected to own a
smartphone [31]. This popularity of mobile devices
is driven by the millions of diverse, feature-rich,
third-party applications or “apps” they support.
However, in fulfilling their functionality, apps of-
ten require access to security and privacy-sensitive
resources on the device (e.g., GPS location, secu-
rity settings). Applications can neither be trusted
to be well-written or benign, and to prevent mis-
use of such access through malicious or vulnerable
apps [59, 44, 98, 80, 35, 87, 32], it is imperative to
understand the challenges in securing mobile apps.
Security analysis of third-party apps has been
one of the dominant areas of smartphone security
research in the last decade, resulting in tools and
frameworks with diverse security goals. For in-
stance, prior work has designed tools to identify
malicious behavior in apps [34, 99, 12], discover pri-
vate data leaks [33, 13, 42, 15], detect vulnerable ap-
plication interfaces [38, 22, 62, 54], identify flaws in
the use of cryptographic primitives [35, 32, 87], and
define sandbox policies for third-party apps [47,
50]. To protect users from malicious or vulnerable
apps, it is imperative to assess the challenges and
pitfalls of existing tools and techniques. However,
it is unclear if existing security tools are robust enough
to expose particularly well-hidden unwanted behaviors.
Our work is motivated by the pressing need
to discover the limitations of application analysis
techniques for Android. Existing application anal-
ysis techniques, specifically those that employ static
analysis, must in practice trade soundness for pre-
cision, as there is an inherent conflict between the
two properties. A sound analysis requires the tech-
nique to over-approximate (i.e., consider instances
of unwanted behavior that may not execute in re-
ality), which in turn deteriorates precision. This
trade-off has practical implications on the security
provided by static analysis tools. That is, in theory,
static analysis is expected to be sound, yet, in prac-
tice, these tools must purposefully make unsound
choices to achieve a feasible analysis that has suf-
ficient precision and performance to scale. For in-
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stance, techniques that analyze Java generally do
not over-approximate analysis of certain program-
ming language features, such as reflection, for prac-
tical reasons (e.g., Soot [90], FlowDroid [13]). While
this particular case is well-known and documented,
many such unsound design choices are neither
well-documented, nor known to researchers out-
side a small community of experts.
Security experts have described such tools as
soundy, i.e., having a core set of sound design
choices, in addition to certain practical assumptions
that sacrifice soundness for precision [61]. While
soundness is an elusive ideal, soundy tools cer-
tainly seem to be a practical choice: but only if the
unsound choices are known, necessary, and clearly docu-
mented. However, the present state of soundy static
analysis techniques is dire, as unsound choices
(1) may not be documented, and unknown to non-
experts, (2) may not even be known to tool de-
signers (i.e., implicit assumptions), and (3) may
propagate to future research. The soundiness man-
ifesto describes the misplaced confidence gener-
ated by the insufficient study and documentation
of soundy tools, in the specific context of language
features [61]. While our work is motivated by the
manifesto, we leverage soundiness at the general,
conceptual level of design choices, and attempt to
resolve the status quo of soundy tools by making
them more secure as well as transparent.
This paper proposes the Mutation-based Soundness
Evaluation (µSE, read as “muse”) framework that
enables systematic security evaluation of Android
static analysis tools to discover unsound design
assumptions, leading to their documentation, as
well as improvements in the tools themselves. µSE
leverages the practice of mutation analysis from the
software engineering (SE) domain [74, 45, 25, 63, 27,
78, 11, 97, 75, 28], and specifically, more recent ad-
vancements in mutating Android apps [58]. In do-
ing so, µSE adapts a well-founded practice from SE
to security, by making useful changes to contextu-
alize it to evaluate security tools.
µSE creates security operators, which reflect the se-
curity goals of the tools being analyzed (e.g., data
leak or SSL vulnerability detection). These security
operators are seeded, i.e., inserted into one or more
Android apps, as guided by a mutation scheme. This
seeding results in the creation of multiple mutants
(i.e., code that represents the target unwanted be-
havior) within the app. Finally, the mutated ap-
plication is analyzed using the security tool being
evaluated, and the undetected mutants are then
subjected to a deeper analysis. We propose a semi-
automated methodology to analyze the uncaught
mutants, resolve them to flaws in the tool, and con-
firm the flaws experimentally.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of µSE by eval-
uating static analysis research tools that detect data
leaks in Android apps (e.g., FlowDroid [13], Ic-
cTA [55]). We evaluate a set of seven tools across
three experiments, and reveal 13 flaws that were
undocumented. We also discover that when a tool
inherits another (i.e., inherits the codebase), all the
flaws propagate. Even in cases wherein a tool only
conceptually inherits another (i.e., leveraging deci-
sions from prior work), just less than half of the flaws
propagate. We provide immediate patches that fix
one flaw, and in other cases, we identify flaw classes
that may need significant research effort. Thus, µSE
not only helps researchers, tool designers, and an-
alysts uncover undocumented flaws and unsound
choices in soundy security tools, but may also pro-
vide immediate benefits by discovering easily fix-
able, but evasive, flaws.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We introduce the novel paradigm of Mutation-
based Soundness Evaluation, which provides a
systematic methodology for discovering flaws
in static analysis tools for Android, leveraging
the well-understood practice of mutation anal-
ysis. We adapt mutation analysis for security
evaluation, and design the abstractions of secu-
rity operators and mutation schemes.
• We design and implement the µSE framework for
evaluating Android static analysis tools. µSE
adapts to the security goals of a tool being eval-
uated, and allows the detection of unknown or
undocumented flaws.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of µSE by eval-
uating several widely-used Android security tools
that detect private data leaks in Android apps.
µSE detects 13 unknown flaws, and validates
their propagation. Our analysis leads to the
documentation of unsound assumptions, and
immediate security fixes in some cases.
Threat Model: µSE is designed to help security re-
searchers evaluate tools that detect vulnerabilities
(e.g., SSl misuse), and more importantly, tools that
detect malicious or suspicious behavior (e.g., data
leaks). Thus, the security operators and mutation
schemes defined in this paper are of an adversar-
ial nature. That is, behavior like “data leaks” is
intentionally malicious/curious, and generally not
attributed to accidental vulnerabilities. Therefore,
to evaluate the soundness of existing tools that de-
tect such behavior, µSE has to develop mutants that
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mimic such adversarial behavior as well, by defin-
ing mutation schemes of an adversarial nature. This
is the key difference between µSE and prior work
on fault/vulnerability injection (e.g., LAVA [30])
that assumes the mutated program to be benign.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Sec-
tion 2 motivates our approach, and provides a brief
background. Section 3 describes the general ap-
proach and the design goals. Section 4 and Sec-
tion 5 describe the design and implementation of
µSE, respectively. Section 6 evaluates the effective-
ness of µSE, and Section 7 delivers the insights dis-
tilled from it. Section 8 describes related work. Sec-
tion 9 describes limitations. Section 10 concludes.
2 Motivation and Background
This work is motivated by the pressing need to help
researchers and practitioners identify instances of
unsound assumptions or design decisions in their
static analysis tools, thereby extending the sound core
of their soundy techniques. That is, security tools
may already have a core set of sound design deci-
sions (i.e., the sound core), and may claim sound-
ness based on those decisions. While the soundi-
ness manifesto [61] defines the sound core in terms
of specific language features, we use the term in a
more abstract manner to refer to the design goals
of the tool. Systematically identifying unsound de-
cisions may allow researchers to resolve flaws and
help extend the sound core of their tools.
Moreover, research papers and tool documen-
tations indeed do not articulate many of the un-
sound assumptions and design choices that lie out-
side their sound core, aside from some well-known
cases (e.g., choosing not to handle reflection, race
conditions), as confirmed by our results (Section 6).
There is also a chance that developers of these tech-
niques may be unaware of some implicit assump-
tions/flaws due to a host of reasons: e.g., because
the assumption was inherited from prior research
or a certain aspect of Android was not modeled
correctly. Therefore, our objective is to discover
instances of such hidden assumptions and design
flaws that affect the security claims made by tools,
document them explicitly, and possibly, help devel-
opers and researchers mend existing artifacts.
2.1 Motivating Example
Consider the following motivating example of a
prominent static analysis tool, FlowDroid [13]:
FlowDroid [13] is a highly popular static analy-
sis framework for detecting private data leaks in
Android apps by performing a data flow analy-
sis. Some of the limitations of FlowDroid are well-
known and stated in the paper [13]; e.g., FlowDroid
does not support reflection, like most static analy-
ses for Java. However, through a systematic eval-
uation of FlowDroid, we discovered a security lim-
itation that is not well-known or accounted for in
the paper, and hence affects guarantees provided
by the tool’s analysis. We discovered that Flow-
Droid (i.e., v1.5, latest as of 10/10/17) does not sup-
port “Android fragments” [10], which are app mod-
ules that are widely used in most Android apps
(i.e., in more than 90% of the top 240 Android apps
per category on Google Play, see Appendix A). This
flaw renders any security analysis of general An-
droid apps using FlowDroid unsound, due to the
high likelihood of fragment use, even when the app
developers may be cooperative and non-malicious.
Further, FlowDroid v2.0, which was recently re-
leased [88], claims to address fragments, but also
failed to detect our exploit. On investigating further,
we found that FlowDroid v1.5 has been extended
by at least 13 research tools [55, 53, 96, 15, 73, 82, 60,
85, 8, 79, 56, 57, 71], none of which acknowledge
or address this limitation in modeling fragments.
This leads us to conclude that this significant flaw
not only persists in FlowDroid, but may have also
propagated to the tools that inherit it. We confirm
this conjecture for inheritors of FlowDroid that also
detect data leaks, and are available in source or bi-
nary form (i.e., 2 out of 13), in Section 6.
Finally, we reported the flaws to the authors of
FlowDroid, and created two patches to fix it. Our
patches were confirmed to work on FlowDroid v2.0
built from source, and were accepted into Flow-
Droid’s repository [89]. Thus, we were able to
discover and fix an undocumented design flaw
that significantly affected FlowDroid’s soundness
claims, thereby expanding its sound core. How-
ever, we have confirmed that FlowDroid v2.5 [88]
still fails to detect leaks in fragments, and are work-
ing with developers to resolve this issue.
Through this example, we demonstrate that un-
sound assumptions in security-focused static analy-
sis tools for Android are not only detrimental to the
validity of their own analysis, but may also inad-
vertently propagate to future research. Thus, iden-
tifying these unsound assumptions is not only ben-
eficial for making the user of the analysis aware
of its true limits, but also for the research commu-
nity in general. As of today, aside from a hand-
ful of manually curated testing toolkits (e.g., Droid-
Bench [13]) with hard-coded (but useful) checks, to
the best of our knowledge, there has been no prior
effort at methodologically discovering problems re-
lated to soundiness in Android static analysis tools
and frameworks. This paper is motivated by the need
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Figure 1: µSE tests a static analysis tool on a set of mu-
tated Android apps and analyzes uncaught mutants to
discover and/or fix flaws.
to systematically identify and resolve the unsound as-
sumptions in security-related static analysis tools.
2.2 Background on Mutation Analysis
Mutation analysis has a strong foundation in the
field of SE, and is typically used as a test adequacy
criterion, measuring the effectiveness of a set of
test cases [74]. Faulty programs are created by ap-
plying transformation rules, called mutation opera-
tors to a given program. The larger the number
of faulty programs or mutants detected by a test
suite, the higher the effectiveness of that particular
suite. Since its inception [45, 25], mutation testing
has seen striking advancements related to the de-
sign and development of advanced operators. Re-
search related to development of mutation opera-
tors has traditionally attempted to adapt operators
for a particular target domain, such as the web [78],
data-heavy applications [11, 97, 28], or GUI-centric
applications [75]. Recently, mutation analysis has
been applied to measure the effectiveness of test
suites for both functional and non-functional re-
quirements of Android apps [26, 49, 58].
This paper builds upon SE concepts of mutation
analysis and adapts them to a security context. Our
methodology does not simply use the traditional
mutation analysis, but rather redefines this method-
ology to effectively improve security-focused static
analysis tools, as we describe in Sections 4 and 8.
3 µSE
We propose µSE, a semi-automated framework
for systematically evaluating Android static anal-
ysis tools that adapts the process of mutation
analysis commonly used to evaluate software test
suites [74]. That is, we aim to help discover con-
crete instances of flawed security design decisions
made by static analysis tools, by exposing them to
methodologically mutated applications. We envi-
sion two primary benefits from µSE: short-term ben-
efits related to straightforwardly fixable flaws that
may be patched immediately, and long-term bene-
fits related to the continuous documentation of as-
sumptions and flaws, even those that may be hard
to resolve. This section provides an overview of
µSE (Figure 1) and its design goals.
As shown in Figure 1, we take an Android static
analysis tool to be evaluated (e.g., FlowDroid [13]
or MalloDroid [35]) as input. µSE executes the tool
on mutants, i.e., apps to which security operators (i.e.,
security-related mutation operators) are applied, as
per a mutation scheme, which governs the placement
of code transformations described by operators in
the app (i.e., thus generating mutants). The secu-
rity operators represent anomalies that the static
analysis tools are expected to detect, and hence, are
closely tied to the security goal of the tool. The un-
caught mutants indicate flaws in the tool, and an-
alyzing them leads to the broader discovery and
awareness of the unsound assumptions of the tools,
eventually facilitating security-improvements.
Design Goals: Measuring the security provided by
a system is a difficult problem; however, we may
be able to better predict failures if the assumptions
made by the system are known in advance. Sim-
ilarly, while soundness may be a distant ideal for
security tools, we assert that it should be feasible
to articulate the boundaries of a tool’s sound core.
Knowing these boundaries would be immensely
useful for analysts who use security tools, for de-
velopers looking for ways to improve tools, as well
as for end users who benefit from the security anal-
yses provided by such tools. To this end, we design
µSE to provide an effective foundation for evaluat-
ing Android security tools. Our design of µSE is
guided by the following goals:
G1 Contextualized security operators. Android secu-
rity tools have diverse purposes and may claim
various security guarantees. Security opera-
tors must be instantiated in a way that is sen-
sitive to the context or purpose (e.g., data leak
identification) of the tool being evaluated.
G2 Android-focused mutation scheme. Android’s
security challenges are notably unique, and
hence require a diverse array of novel security
analyses. Thus, the mutation schemes, i.e., the
placement of the target, unwanted behavior in
the app, must consider Android’s abstractions
and application model for effectiveness.
G3 Minimize manual-effort during analysis. While
µSE is certainly more feasible than manual
analysis, we intend to significantly reduce the
manual effort spent on evaluating undetected
mutants. Thus, our goal is to dynamically fil-
ter inconsequential mutants, as well as to de-
velop a systematic methodology for resolving
undetected mutants to flaws.
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G4 Minimize overhead. We expect µSE to be used by
security researchers as well as tool users and
developers. Hence, we must ensure that µSE
is efficient so as to to promote a wide-scale de-
ployment and community-based use of µSE.
4 Design
Figure 2 provides a conceptual description of the
process followed by µSE, which consists of three
main steps. In Step 1, we specify the security oper-
ators and mutation schemes that are relevant to the
security goals of the tool being evaluated (e.g., data
leak detection), as well as certain unique abstrac-
tions of Android that separately motivate this anal-
ysis. In Step 2, we mutate one or more Android apps
using the security operators and defined mutation
schemes using a Mutation Engine (ME). After this
step each app is said to contain one or more mu-
tants. To maximize effectiveness, mutation schemes
in µSE stipulate that mutants should be systemat-
ically injected into all potential locations in code
where operators can be instantiated. In order to
limit the effort required for manual analysis due to
potentially large numbers of mutants, we first fil-
ter out the non-executing mutants in the Android
app(s) using a dynamic Execution Engine (EE) (Sec-
tion 5). In Step 3, we apply the security tool under
investigation to analyze the mutated app, leading it
to detect some or all of the mutants as anomalies.
We perform a methodological manual analysis of
the undetected mutants, which may lead to docu-
mentation of flaws, and software patches.
Note that tools sharing a security goal (e.g.,
FlowDroid[13], Argus [39], HornDroid [20] and
BlueSeal [84] all detect data leaks) can be ana-
lyzed using the same security operators and muta-
tion schemes, and hence the mutated apps, signif-
icantly reducing the overall cost of operating µSE
(Goal G4). The rest of this section describes the de-
sign contributions of µSE. The precise implementa-
tion details can be found in Section 5.
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...
Figure 3: A generic ”network export” security operator,
and its more fine-grained instantiations in the context of
FlowDroid [13] and MalloDroid [35].
4.1 Security Operators
A security operator is a description of the un-
wanted behavior that the security tool being ana-
lyzed aims to detect. When designing security op-
erators, we are faced with an important question:
what do we want to express? Specifically, the opera-
tor might be too coarse or fine-grained; finding the
correct granularity is the key.
For instance, defining operators specific to the
implementations of individual tools may not be
scalable. On the contrary, defining a generic secu-
rity operator for all the tools may be too simplistic
to be effective. Consider the following example:
Figure 3 describes the limitation of using a
generic security operator that describes code which
“exports data to the network”. Depending on the
tool being evaluated, we may need a unique, fine-
grained, specification of this operator. For exam-
ple, for evaluating FlowDroid [13], we may need to
express the specific types of private data that can
be exported via any of the network APIs, i.e., the
data portion of the operator is more important than
what network API is used. However, for evaluat-
ing a tool that detects vulnerable SSL connections
(e.g., CryptoLint [32]), we may want to express the
use of vulnerable SSL APIs (i.e., of SSL classes that
can be overridden, such as a custom TrustManager
that trusts all certificates) without much concern for
what data is exported. That is, the requirements are
practically orthogonal for these two use cases, ren-
dering a generic operator useless, while precisely
designing tool-specific operators may not scale.
In µSE, we take a balanced approach to solve this
problem: instead of tying a security operator to a
specific tool, we define it in terms of the security
goal of the concerned tool (Goal G1). Since the se-
curity goal influences the properties exhibited by a
security analysis, security operators designed with
a particular goal in consideration would apply to all
the tools that claim to have that security goal, hence
making them feasible and scalable to design. For
instance, a security operator that reads information
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1 Inject:
2 String dataLeak## = java.util.Calendar.getInstance
().getTimeZone().getDisplayName();
3 android.util.Log.d("leak-##", dataLeak##);
Listing 1: Security operator that injects a data leak from
the Calendar API access to the device log.
from a private source (e.g., IMEI, location) and ex-
ports it to a public sink (e.g., the device log, storage)
would be appropriate to use for all the tools that
claim to detect private data leaks (e.g., Argus [39],
HornDroid [20], BlueSeal [84]). For instance, one
of our implemented operators for evaluating tools
that detect data leaks is as described in Listing 1.
Moreover, security operators generalize to other se-
curity goals as well; a simple operator for evaluat-
ing tools that detect vulnerable SSL use (e.g., Mallo-
Droid) could add a TrustManager with a vulner-
able isServerTrusted method that returns true,
which, when combined with our expressive mu-
tation schemes (Section 4.2), would generate a di-
verse set of mutants.
To derive security operators at the granularity of
the security goal, we must examine the claims made
by existing tools; i.e., security tools must certainly
detect the unwanted behavior that they claim to de-
tect, unless affected by some unsound design choice
that hinders detection. In order to precisely identify
what a tool considers as a security flaw, and claims
to detect, we inspected the following sources:
1) Research Papers: The tool’s research paper is of-
ten the primary source of information about what
unwanted behavior a tool seeks to detect. We in-
spect the properties and variations of the unwanted
behavior as described in the paper, as well as the
examples provided, to formulate security operator
specifications for injecting the unwanted behavior
in an app. However, we do not create operators us-
ing the limitations and assumptions already docu-
mented in the paper or well-known in general (e.g.,
leaks in reflection and dynamically loaded code), as
µSE seeks to find unknown assumptions.
2) Open source tool documentation: Due to space
limitations or tool evolution over time, research pa-
pers may not always have the most complete or
up-to-date information considering what security
flaws a tool can actually address. We used tool
documentation available in online appendices and
open source repositories to fill this knowledge gap.
3) Testing toolkits: Manually-curated testing toolk-
its (e.g., DroidBench [13]) may be available, and
may provide examples of baseline operators.
4.2 Mutation Schemes
To enable the security evaluation of static analy-
sis tools, µSE must seed mutations within Android
apps. We define the specific methods for choosing
where to apply security operators to inject mutations
within Android apps as the mutation scheme.
The mutation scheme depends on a number of
factors: (1) Android’s unique abstractions, (2), the
intent to over-approximate reachability for cover-
age, and (3) the security goal of the tool being ana-
lyzed (i.e., similar to security operators). Note that
while mutation schemes using the first two factors
may be generally applied to any type of static anal-
ysis tool (e.g., SSL vulnerability and malware detec-
tors), the third factor, as the description suggests,
will only apply to a specific security goal, which in
the light of this paper, is data leak detection.
We describe each factor independently, as a mu-
tation scheme, in the context of the following run-
ning example described previously in Section 2:
Recall that FlowDroid [13], the target of our anal-
ysis in Section 2, detects data leaks in Android
apps. Hence, FlowDroid loosely defines a data
leak as a flow from a sensitive source of infor-
mation to some sink that exports it. FlowDroid
lists all of the sources and sinks within a config-
urable “SourcesAndSinks.txt” file in its tool doc-
umentation, from which it first selects a simple
source java.util.Calendar.getTimeZone()
and a simple sink android.util.Log.d(). We
then design a data leak operator, as shown in List-
ing 1. Using this security operator, we implement
the following three different mutation schemes.
4.2.1 Leveraging Android Abstractions
The Android platform and app model support nu-
merous abstractions that pose challenges to static
analysis. One commonly stated example is the ab-
sence of a Main method as an entry-point into the
app, which compels static analysis tools to scan for
the various entry points, and treat them all similarly
to a traditional Main method [13, 48].
Based on our domain knowledge of Android and
its security, we choose the following features as a
starting point in a mutation scheme that models
unique aspects of Android, and more importantly,
tests the ability of analysis tools to detect unwanted
behavior placed within these features (Goal G2):
1) Activity and Fragment lifecycle: Android apps
are organized into a number of activity components,
which form the user interface (UI) of the app. The
activity lifecycle is controlled via a set of callbacks,
which are executed whenever an app is launched,
paused, closed, started, or stopped [3]. Fragments
are also UI elements that possess similar callbacks,
though they are often used in a manner secondary
to activities. We design our mutation scheme to
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1 final Button button = findViewById(R.id.button_id);
2 button.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener()
{public void onClick(View v) {// Code here executes
on main thread after user presses button}});
Listing 2: Dynamically created onClick callback
place mutants within methods of fragments and ac-
tivities where applicable, so as to test a tool’s ability
to model the activity and fragment lifecycles.
2) Callbacks: Since much of Android relies on call-
backs triggered by events, these callbacks pose a
significant challenge to traditional static analyses,
as their code can be executed asynchronously in
several different potential orders. We place mutants
within these asynchronous callbacks to test the
tools’ ability to soundly model the asynchronous
nature of Android. For instance, consider the ex-
ample in Listing 2, where the onClick() callback can
execute at any point of time.
3) Intent messages: Android apps communicate
with one another and listen for system-level events
using Intents, Intent Filters, and Broadcast Re-
ceivers [2, 1]. Specifically, Intent Filters and Broad-
cast Receivers form another major set of callbacks
into the app. Moreover, Broadcast Receivers can
be dynamically registered. Our mutation scheme
not only places mutants in the statically registered
callbacks such as those triggered by Intent Fil-
ters in the app’s Android Manifest, but also call-
backs dynamically registered within the program,
and even within other callbacks, i.e., recursively.
For instance, we generate a dynamically registered
broadcast receiver inside another dynamically reg-
istered broadcast receiver, and instantiate the se-
curity operator within the inner broadcast receiver
(see Listing 3 in Appendix B for the code).
4) XML resource files: Although Android apps are
primarily written in Java, they also include resource
files that establish callbacks. Such resource files also
allow the developer to register for callbacks from
an action on a UI object (e.g., the onClick event, for
callbacks on a button being touched). As described
previously, static analysis tools often list these call-
backs on par with the Main function, i.e., as one of
the many entry points into the app. We incorporate
these resource files into our mutation scheme, i.e.,
mutate them to call our specific callback methods.
4.2.2 Evaluating Reachability
The objective behind this simple, but important,
mutation scheme is to exercise the reachability anal-
ysis of the tool being evaluated. We inject mutants
(e.g., data leaks from our example) at the start of ev-
ery method in the app. While the previous schemes
add methods to the app (e.g., new callbacks), this
scheme simply verifies if the app successfully mod-
els the bare minimum.
4.2.3 Leveraging the Security Goal
Like security operators, mutation schemes may also
be designed in a way that accounts for the security
goal of the tool being evaluated (Goal G1). Such
schemes may be applied to any tool with a similar
objective. In keeping with our motivating exam-
ple (Section 2) and our evaluation (Section 6), we
develop an example mutation scheme that can be
specifically applied to evaluate data leak detectors.
This scheme infers two ways of adding mutants:
1) Taint-based operator placement: This placement
methodology tests the tools’ ability to recognize an
asynchronous ordering of callbacks, by placing the
source in one callback and the sink in another. The ex-
ecution of the source and sink may be triggered
due to the user, and the app developer (i.e., es-
pecially a malicious adversary) may craft the mu-
tation scheme specifically so that the sources and
sinks lie on callbacks that generally execute in se-
quence. However, this sequence may not be observ-
able through just static analysis. A simple exam-
ple is collecting the source data in the onStart() call-
back, and leaking it in the onResume() callback. As
per the activity lifecycle, the onResume() callback
always executes right after the onStart() callback.
2) Complex-Path operator placement: Our pre-
liminary analysis demonstrated that static analy-
sis tools may sometimes stop after an arbitrary
number of hops when analyzing a call graph, for
performance reasons. This finding motivated the
complex-path operator placement. In this scheme,
we make the path between source and sink as com-
plex as possible (i.e., which is ordinarily one line of
code, as seen in Listing 1). That is, the design of
this scheme allows the injection of code along the
path from source to sink based on a set of prede-
fined rules. In our evaluation, we instantiate this
scheme with a rule that recreates the String vari-
able saved by the source, by passing each character
of the string into a StringBuilder, then sending the
resulting string to the sink. µSE allows the analyst
to dynamically implement such rules, as long as the
input and output are both strings, and the rule com-
plicates the path between them by sending the in-
put through an arbitrary set of transformations.
In a traditional mutation analysis setting, the mu-
tation placement strategy would seek to minimize
the number of non-compilable mutants. However,
as our goal is to evaluate the soundness of Android
security tools, we design our mutation scheme to
over-approximate. Once the mutated apps are cre-
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Figure 4: The number of mutants (e.g., data leaks) to an-
alyze drastically reduces at every stage in the process.
ated, for a feasible analysis, we pass them through a
dynamic filter that removes the mutants that cannot
be executed, ensuring that the mutants that each se-
curity tool is evaluated against are all executable.
4.3 Analysis Feasibility & Methodology
µSE reduces manual effort by filtering out mutants
whose security flaws are not verified by dynamic
analysis (Goal G3). As described in Figure 2, for
any given mutated app, we use a dynamic filter (i.e.,
the Execution Engine (EE), described in Section 5)
to purge non-executable leaks. If a mutant (e.g., a
data leak) exists in the mutated app, but is not con-
firmed as executable by the filter, we discard it. For
example, data leaks injected in dead code are fil-
tered out. Thus, when the Android security tools
are applied to the mutated apps, only mutants that
were executed by EE are considered.
Furthermore, after the security tools were ap-
plied to mutant apps, only undetected mutants are
considered during analyst analysis. The reduction
in the number of mutants subject to analysis at each
step of the µSE process is illustrated in Figure 4.
The following methodology is used by an analyst
for each undetected mutant after testing a given se-
curity tool to isolate and confirm flaws:
1) Identifying the Source and Sink: During mu-
tant generation, µSE’s ME injects a unique mu-
tant identifier, as well as the source and sink us-
ing util.Log.d statements. Thus, for each undetected
mutant, an analyst simply looks up the unique IDs
in the source to derive the source and sink.
2) Performing Leak Call-Chain Analysis: Since
the data leaks under analysis went undetected by
a given static analysis tool, this implies that there
exists one (or multiple) method call sequences (i.e.,
call-chains) invoking the source and sink that could
not be modeled by the tool. Thus, a security ana-
lyst inspects the code of a mutated app, and identi-
fies the observable call sequences from various en-
try points. This is aided by dynamic information
from the EE so that an analyst can examine the or-
der of execution of detected data leaks to infer the
propagation of leaks through different call chains.
3) Synthesizing Minimal Examples: For each of
the identified call sequences invoking a given unde-
tected data leak’s source and sink, an analyst then
attempts to synthesize a minimal example by re-
creating the call sequence using only the required
Android APIs or method calls from the mutated
app. This info is then inserted into a pre-defined
skeleton app project so that it can be again analyzed
by the security tools to confirm a flaw.
4) Validating the Minimal Example: Once the min-
imal example has been synthesized by the analyst,
it must be validated against the security tool that
failed to detect it earlier. If the tool fails to detect
the minimal example, then the process ends with
the confirmation of a flaw in the tool. If the tool is
able to detect the examples, the analyst can either
iteratively refine the examples, or discard the mu-
tant, and move on to the next example.
5 Implementation
This section provides the implementation details of
µSE: (1) ME for mutating apps, and (2) EE for exer-
cising mutants to filter out non-executing ones. We
have made µSE available for use by the wider secu-
rity research community [89], along with the data
generated or used in our experiments (e.g., opera-
tors, flaws) and code samples.
1. Mutation Engine (ME): The ME allows µSE to
automatically mutate apps according to a fixed set
of security operators and mutation schemes. ME is
implemented in Java and builds upon the MDROID+
mutation framework for Android [58]. Firstly, ME
derives a mutant injection profile (MIP) of all pos-
sible injection points for a given mutation scheme,
security operator, and target app source code. The
MIP is derived through one of two types of analy-
sis: (i) text-based parsing and matching of xml files
in the case of app resources; or (ii) using Abstract
Syntax Tree (AST) based analysis for identifying po-
tential injection points in code. µSE takes a system-
atic approach toward applying mutants to a target
app, and for each mutant location stipulated by the
MIP for a given app, a mutant is seeded. The injec-
tion process also uses either text- or AST-based code
transformation rules to modify the code or resource
files. In the context of our evaluation, µSE fur-
ther marks injected mutants in the source code with
log-based indicators that include a unique identi-
fier for each mutant, as well as the source and sink
for the injected leak. This information can be cus-
tomized for future security operators and exported
as a ledger that tracks mutant data. µSE can be ex-
tended to additional security operators and muta-
tion schemes by adding methods to derive the MIP,
8
and perform target code transformations.
Given the time cost in running the studied
security-focused static analysis tools on a set of
apks, µSE breaks from the process used by tradi-
tional mutation analysis frameworks that seed each
mutant into a separate program version, and seeds
all mutants into a single version of a target app. Fi-
nally, the target app is automatically compiled us-
ing its build system (e.g., gradle [6], ant [4]) so that
it can be dynamically analyzed by the EE.
2. Execution Engine (EE): To facilitate a feasible
manual analysis of the mutants that are undetected
by a security analysis tool, µSE uses the EE to dy-
namically analyze target apps, verifying whether or
not injected mutants can be executed in practice.
This EE builds upon prior work in automated in-
put generation for Android apps by adapting the
systematic exploration strategies from the CRASH-
SCOPE tool [66, 65] to explore a target app’s GUI.
We discuss the limitations of the EE in Section 9.
For more details, please see Appendix C.
6 Evaluation
The main goal of our evaluation is to measure the ef-
fectiveness of µSE at uncovering flaws in security-
focused static analysis tools for Android apps, and
to demonstrate the extent of such flaws. For this
study, we focus on tools that detect private data
leaks on a device. Specifically, we focus on a set of
seven data leak detectors for Android that use static
analysis, primarily due to the availability of their
source code, namely FlowDroid [13], Argus [39]
(previously known as AmanDroid), DroidSafe [43],
IccTA [55], BlueSeal [84], HornDroid [20], and Did-
Fail [53]. For all the tools except FlowDroid, we
use the latest release version when available; in
FlowDroid’s case, we used its v2.0 release for our
µSE analysis, and confirmed our findings with its
later releases (i.e., v2.5 and v2.5.1). Additionally,
we use a set of 7 open-source Android apps from
F-droid [5] that we mutate. These 7 apps produced
2026 mutants to inspect, which led to the discovery
of 13 flaws. A larger dataset of apps is likely to gen-
erate more mutants, and lead to more flaws.
In this section, we describe the highlights of our
evaluation (Section 6.1), along with the three exper-
iments we conduct, and their results. In the first
experiment (Section 6.2), we run µSE on three tools,
and record the number of leaks that each tool fails
to detect (i.e., the number of uncaught mutants).
In the second experiment (Section 6.3), we per-
form an in-depth analysis of FlowDroid by apply-
ing our systematic manual analysis methodology
(Section 4.3) on the output of µSE for FlowDroid.
Finally, our third experiment (Section 6.4) measures
the propagation and prevalence of the flaws found
in FlowDroid, in tools from our dataset apart from
FlowDroid, and two newer versions of FlowDroid.
These experiments are motivated by the follow-
ing research questions:
RQ1 Can µSE find security problems in static analysis
tools for Android, and help resolve them to flaws/
unsound choices?
RQ2 Are flaws inherited when a tool is reused (or built
upon) by another tool?
RQ3 Does the semi-automated methodology of µSE allow
a feasible analysis (in terms of manual effort)?
RQ4 Are all flaws unearthed by µSE difficult to resolve,
or can some be isolated and patched?
RQ5 How robust is µSE’s performance?
6.1 Evaluation overview and Highlights
We insert a total of 7,584 data leaks (i.e., mutants) in
a set of 7 applications using µSE. 2,026mutants are
verified as executable by the EE, and 83-1,480 are
not detected depending on the studied tool. During
our analysis, µSE exhibits a maximum one-cost run-
time of 92minutes (RQ5), apart from the time taken
by the analyzed tool (e.g., FlowDroid) itself. Fur-
ther, our in-depth analysis of the output of µSE for
FlowDroid discovers 13 unique flaws that are not
documented in either the paper or the source code
repository (RQ1). Moreover, it takes our analyst, a
graduate student with background in Android se-
curity, one hour per flaw (in the worst case), due to
our systematic analysis methodology, as well as our
dynamic filter (Section 4.3), which filters out over
73 % of the seeded non-executable mutants (RQ3).
Further, we demonstrate that two newer versions
of FlowDroid, as well as the six other tools set apart
from FlowDroid (including those that inherit it), are
also vulnerable to at least one flaw detected in Flow-
Droid (RQ2). This is confirmed, with negligible ef-
fort, using minimal examples generated during our
analysis of FlowDroid (RQ3). Finally, we are able
to generate patches for a specific flaw discovered in
FlowDroid, and our pull request has been accepted
by the tool authors (RQ4).
6.2 Executing µSE
The objective of this experiment is to demon-
strate the effectiveness of µSE in filtering out non-
executable injected leaks (i.e., mutants), while illus-
trating that this process results in a reasonable num-
ber of leaks for an analyst to manually examine.
Methodology: We create 21 mutated APKs from 7
target applications, with 7,584 leaks among them,
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Table 1: The number and percentage of leaks not de-
tected by 3 popular data leak detection tools.
Tool Undetected Leaks Undetected Leaks (%)
FlowDroid v2.0 987/2,026 48.7%
Argus 1,480/2,026 73.1%
DroidSafe 83/2,026 4.1%
by combining the security operators described
in Section 4.1, with mutation schemes from Sec-
tion 4.2. First, we measure the total number of leaks
injected across all apps, and then the total number
of leaks marked by the EE as non-executable. Note
that this number is independent of the tools in-
volved, i.e., the filtering only happens once, and the
mutated APKs can then be passed to any number
of tools for analysis. The non-executable leaks are
then removed. Next, we configure FlowDroid, Ar-
gus, and DroidSafe and evaluate each tool with µSE
individually, by running them on the mutated apps
(with non-executable leaks excluded) and record-
ing the number of leaks not detected by each tool
(i.e., the surviving mutants).
Results: µSE injects 7,584 leaks into the Android
apps, of which, 5,558 potentially non-executable
leaks are filtered out using our EE, leaving only
2,026 leaks confirmed as executable in the mutated
apps. By filtering out a large number of potentially
non-executable leaks (i.e., over 73%), our dynamic
filtering significantly reduces manual effort (RQ3).
Table 1 shows the statistics acquired from µSE’s
output over FlowDroid, Argus, and DroidSafe. We
observe that FlowDroid cannot detect over 48% of
the leaks, while Argus cannot detect over 73%. Fur-
ther, DroidSafe does not detect a non-negligible
percentage of leaks (i.e., over 4%), and as these leaks
have been confirmed to execute by our EE, it is
safe to say that DroidSafe has flaws as well. Note
that this experimental result validates our concep-
tual argument, that security operators designed for
a specific goal may apply to tools with that goal.
However, given its popularity, we limit our in-
depth evaluation to FlowDroid.
Finally, we measure the runtime of the µSE-
specific part of the analysis, i.e., up to executing the
tool to be evaluated, to be a constant 92 minutes
in the worst case, a majority of which (i.e., 99%) is
taken up by the EE. Note that the time taken by µSE
is a one-time cost, and does not have to be repeated
for tools with a similar security goal (RQ5).
6.3 FlowDroid Analysis
This experiment demonstrates an in-depth, manual
analysis of FlowDroid, which we choose for two
reasons: (1) impact (FlowDroid is cited by 700 pa-
pers and numerous other tools depend on it), and
(2) potential for change (since FlowDroid is being
maintained at the moment, any contributions we
can make will have immediate benefits).
Methodology: We performed an in-depth analysis
using the list of surviving mutants (i.e., undetected
leaks) generated by µSE for FlowDroid v2.0 in the
previous experiment. We leveraged the methodol-
ogy for systematic manual evaluation, described in
Section 4.3, and discovered 13 unique flaws. We
confirmed that none of the discovered flaws have been
documented before; i.e., in the FlowDroid paper or in
their official documentation.
Results: We discovered 13 unique flaws, from
FlowDroid alone, demonstrating that µSE can be
effectively used to find problems that can be re-
solved to flaws (RQ1). Using the approach from
Section 4.3, the analyst needed less than an hour to
isolate a flaw from the set of undetected mutants, in
the worst case. In the best case, flaws were found in
a matter of minutes, demonstrating that the amount
of manual effort required to quickly find flaws us-
ing µSE is minimal (RQ3). We give descriptions of
the flaws discovered as a result of µSE’s analysis in
Table 2.
We have reported these flaws, and are working
with the developers to resolve the issues. In fact,
we developed patches to correctly implement Frag-
ment support (i.e., flaw 13 in Table 2), which were
accepted by developers.
To gain insight about the practical challenges
faced by static analysis tools, and their design
flaws, we further categorize the discovered flaws
into the following flaw classes:
FC1: Missing Callbacks: The security tool (e.g.,
FlowDroid) does not recognize some callback
method(s), and will not find leaks placed within
them. Tools that use lists of APIs or callbacks
are susceptible to this problem, as prior work has
demonstrated as the generated list of callbacks (1)
may not be complete, and (2) or may not be up-
dated as the Android platform evolves. We found
both these cases in our analysis of FlowDroid. That
is, DialogFragments was added in API 11, i.e.,before
FlowDroid was released, and NavigationView was
added after. These limitations are well-known in
the community of researchers at the intersection of
program analysis and Android security, and have
been documented by prior work [21]. However,
µSE helps evaluate the robustness of existing se-
curity tools against these flaws, and helps in un-
covering these undocumented flaws for the wider
security audience. Additionally, some of these flaws
may not be resolved even after adding the callback to
the list; e.g.,PhoneStateListener and SQLiteOpen-
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Table 2: Descriptions of flaws uncovered in FlowDroid v2.0
Flaw Description
FC1: Missing Callbacks
1. DialogFragmentShow FlowDroid misses the DialogFragment.onCreateDialog() callback registered by DialogFragment.show().
2. PhoneStateListener FlowDroid does not recognize the onDataConnectionStateChanged() callback for classes extending the
PhoneStateListener abstract class from the telephony package.
3. NavigationView FlowDroid does not recognize the onNavigationItemSelected() callback of classes implementing the interface
NavigationView.OnNavigationItemSelectedListener.
4. SQLiteOpenHelper FlowDroid misses the onCreate() callback of classes extending android.database.sqlite.SQLiteOpenHelper.
5. Fragments FlowDroid 2.0 does not model Android Fragments correctly. We added a patch, which was promptly ac-
cepted. However, FlowDroid 2.5 and 2.5.1 remain affected. We investigate this further in the next section.
FC2: Missing Implicit Calls
6. RunOnUIThread FlowDroid misses the path to Runnable.run() for Runnables passed into Activity.runOnUIThread().
7. ExecutorService FlowDroid misses the path to Runnable.run() for Runnables passed into ExecutorService.submit().
FC3: Incorrect Modeling of Anonymous Classes
8. ButtonOnClickToDialogOnClick FlowDroid does not recognize the onClick() callback of DialogInterface.OnClickListener when instantiated
within a Button’s onClick=“method name” callback defined in XML. FlowDroid will recognize this callback
if the class is instantiated elsewhere, such as within an Activity’s onCreate() method.
9. BroadcastReceiver FlowDroid misses the onReceive() callback of a BroadcastReceiver implemented programmatically and reg-
istered within another programmatically defined and registered BroadcastReceiver’s onReceive() callback.
FC4: Incorrect Modeling of Asynchronous Methods
10. LocationListenerTaint FlowDroid misses the flow from a source in the onStatusChanged() callback to a sink in the onLocation-
Changed() callback of the LocationListener interface, despite recognizing leaks wholly contained in either.
11. NSDManager FlowDroid misses the flow from sources in any callback of a NsdManager.DiscoveryListener to a sink in any
callback of a NsdManager.ResolveListener, when the latter is created within one of the former’s callbacks.
12. ListViewCallbackSequential FlowDroid misses the flow from a source to a sink within different methods of a class obtained via Adapter-
View.getItemAtPosition() within the onItemClick() callback of an AdapterView.OnItemClickListener.
13. ThreadTaint FlowDroid misses the flow to a sink within a Runnable.run() method started by a Thread, only when that
Thread is saved to a variable before Thread.start() is called.
Helper, both added in API 1, are not interfaces, but
abstract classes. Therefore, adding them to Flow-
Droid’s list of callbacks (i.e.,AndroidCallbacks.txt)
does not resolve the issue.
FC2: Missing Implicit Call: The security tool
does not identify leaks within some method that
is implicitly called by another method. For in-
stance, FlowDroid does not recognize the path to
Runnable.run() when a Runnable is passed into the
ExecutorService.submit(Runnable). The response
from the developers indicated that this class of
flaws was due to an unresolved design challenge
in Soot’s [90] SPARK algorithm, upon which Flow-
Droid depends. This limitation is also known
within the program analysis community [21]. How-
ever, the documentation of this gap, thanks to µSE,
would certainly help developers and researchers in
the wider security community.
FC3: Incorrect Modeling of Anonymous Classes:
The security tool misses data leaks expressed
within an anonymous class. For example, Flow-
Droid does not recognize leaks in the onReceive()
callback of a dynamically registered Broadcas-
tReceiver, which is implemented within another
dynamically registered BroadcastReceiver’s onRe-
ceive() callback. It is important to note that finding
such complex flaws is only possible due to µSE’s
semi-automated mechanism, and may be rather
prohibitive for an entirely manual analysis.
FC4: Incorrect Modeling of Asynchronous Meth-
ods: The security tool does not recognize a data
leak whose source and sink are called within differ-
ent methods that are asynchronously executed. For
instance, FlowDroid does not recognize the flow be-
tween data leaks in two callbacks (i.e., onLocation-
Changed and onStatusChanged) of the Location-
Listener class, which the adversary may cause to
execute sequentially (i.e., as our EE confirmed).
Apart from FC1, which may be patched with lim-
ited efforts, the other three categories of flaws may
require a significant amount of research effort to re-
solve. However, documenting them is critical to
increase awareness of real challenges faced by An-
droid static analysis tools.
6.4 Flaw Propagation Study
The objective of this experiment is to determine
if the flaws discovered in FlowDroid have propa-
gated to the tools that inherit it, and to determine
whether other static analysis tools that do not in-
herit FlowDroid are similarly flawed.
Methodology: We check if the two newer release
versions of FlowDroid (i.e., v2.5, and v2.5.1), as well
as 6 other tools (i.e., Argus, DroidSafe, IccTA, Blue-
Seal, HornDroid, and DidFail), are susceptible to
any of the flaws discussed previously in FlowDroid
v2.0, by using the tools to analyze the minimal ex-
ample APKs generated during the in-depth analy-
sis of FlowDroid.
Results: As seen in the Table 3, all the versions
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Table 3: Flaws present in data leak detectors. Note that a “−” indicates tool crash with the minimal APK, a “X”
indicates presence of the flaw, and a “x” indicates absence, and *FD = FlowDroid.
Flaw FD∗ v2.5.1 FD∗ v2.5 FD∗ v2.0 Blueseal IccTA HornDroid Argus DroidSafe DidFail
DialogFragmentShow X X X x X X x x X
PhoneStateListener X X X x X X x x X
NavigationView X X X - X - X - X
SQLiteOpenHelper X X X x X X X x X
Fragments X X X X X X X - X
RunOnUIThread X X X x X X X x X
ExecutorService X X X x X X X x X
ButtonOnClickToDialogOnClick X X X x X x x X X
BroadcastReceiver X X X x X x x x X
LocationListenerTaint X X X x X x x x X
NSDManager X X X x X x X x X
ListViewCallbackSequential X X X x X x x x X
ThreadTaint X X X x X x x x X
of FlowDroid are susceptible to the flaws discov-
ered from our analysis of FlowDroid v2.0. Note
that while we fixed the Fragment flaw and our
patch was accepted to FlowDroid’s codebase, the
latest releases of FlowDroid (i.e., v2.5 and v2.5.1)
still seem to have this flaw. We are working with
the developers on a solution.
A significant observation from the Table 3 is that
the tools that directly inherit FlowDroid (i.e., IccTA,
DidFail) are similarly flawed as FlowDroid. This
is especially true when the tools do not augment
FlowDroid in any manner, and use it as a black box
(RQ2). On the contrary, Argus, which is motivated
by FlowDroid’s design, but augments it on its own,
does not exhibit as many flaws.
Also, BlueSeal, HornDroid, and DroidSafe use
a significantly different methodology, and are also
not susceptible to these flaws. Interestingly, Blue-
Seal and DroidSafe are similar to FlowDroid in that
they use Soot to construct a control flow graph, and
rely on it to identify paths between sources and
sinks. However, BlueSeal and DroidSafe both aug-
ment the graph in novel ways, and thus don’t ex-
hibit the flaws found in FlowDroid.
Finally, our analysis does not imply that Flow-
Droid is weaker than the tools which have fewer
flaws in Table 3. However, it does indicate that
the flaws discovered may be typical of the design
choices made in FlowDroid, and inherited by the
tools such as IccTA and DidFail. A similar deep ex-
ploration into the results of µSE for the other tools
may be explored in the future (e.g., of the 83 un-
caught leaks in DroidSafe from Section 6.2).
7 Discussion
µSE has demonstrated efficiency and effectiveness
at revealing real undocumented flaws in prominent
Android security analysis tools. While experts in
Android static analysis may be familiar with some
of the flaws we discovered (e.g., some flaws in FC1
and FC2), we aim to document these flaws for the
entire scientific community. Further, µSE indeed
found some design gaps that were surprising to
expert developers; e.g., FlowDroid’s design does
not consider callbacks in anonymous inner classes
(flaws 8-9, Table 3), and in our interaction with the
developers of FlowDroid, they acknowledged han-
dling such classes as a non-trivial problem. During
our evaluation of µSE we were able to glean the fol-
lowing pertinent insights:
Insight 1: Simple and security goal-specific muta-
tion schemes are effective. While certain muta-
tion schemes may be Android-specific, our re-
sults demonstrate limited dependence on these
configurations. Out of the 13 flaws discovered
by µSE, the Android-influenced mutation scheme
(Section 4.2.1) revealed one (i.e., BroadCastReceiver
in Table 3), while the rest were evenly distributed
among the other two mutation schemes; i.e., the
schemes that evaluate reachability (Section 4.2.2) or
leverage the security goal (Section 4.2.3).
Insight 2: Security-focused static analysis tools ex-
hibit undocumented flaws that require further evalua-
tion and analysis. Our results clearly demonstrate
that previously unknown security flaws or undocu-
mented design assumptions, which can be detected
by µSE, pervade existing Android security static
analysis tools. Our findings not only motivate the
dire need for systematic discovery, fixing and doc-
umentation of unsound choices in these tools, but
also clearly illustrate the power of mutation based
analysis adapted in security context.
Insight 3: Current tools inherit flaws from legacy tools.
A key insight from our work is that while inherit-
ing code of the foundational tools (e.g., FlowDroid)
is a common practice, some of the researchers may
not necessarily be aware of the unsound choices
they are inheriting as well. As our study results
demonstrate, when a tool inherits another tool di-
rectly (e.g., IccTA inherits FlowDroid), all the flaws
propagate. More importantly, even in those cases
where the tool does not directly inherit the code-
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base, unsound choices may still propagate at the
conceptual level and result in real flaws.
Insight 4: As tools, libraries, and the Android plat-
form evolve, security problems become harder to track
down. Due the nature of software evolution, all
the analysis tools, underlying libraries, and the An-
droid platform itself evolve asynchronously. A few
changes in the Android API may introduce undoc-
umented flaws in analysis tools. µSE handles this
fundamental obstacle of continuous change by en-
suring that each version of an analysis tool is sys-
tematically tested, as we realize while tracking the
Fragment flaw in multiple versions of FlowDroid.
Insight 5: Benchmarks need to evolve with time.
While manually-curated benchmarks (e.g., Droid-
Bench [13]) are highly useful as a ”first line of de-
fense” in checking if a tool is able to detect well-
known flaws, the downside of relying too heavily
on benchmarks is that they only provide a known,
finite number of tests, leading to a false sense of se-
curity. Due to constant changes (insight #3) bench-
marks are likely to become less relevant unless they
are constantly augmented, which requires tremen-
dous effort and coordination. µSE significantly re-
duces this burden on benchmark creators via its
suite of extensible and expressive security oper-
ators and mutation schemes, which can continu-
ously evaluate new versions of tools. The key in-
sight we derive from our experience building µSE is
that while benchmarks may check for documented flaws,
µSE’s true strength is in discovering new flaws.
8 Related Work
µSE builds upon the theoretical underpinnings of
mutation analysis from SE, and to our knowledge,
is the first work to adapt mutation analysis to evalu-
ate the soundness claimed by security tools. More-
over, µSE adapts mutation analysis to security, and
makes fundamental and novel modifications (de-
scribed previously in Section 4). In this section, we
survey related work in three other related areas:
Formally Verifying Soundness: While an ideal
approach, formal verification is one of the most
difficult problems in computer security. For in-
stance, prior work on formally verifying apps of-
ten requires the monitor to be rewritten in a new
language or use verification-specific programming
constructs (e.g., verifying reference monitors [41,
91], information flows in apps [67, 68, 95]), which
poses practical concerns for tools based on nu-
merous legacy codebases (e.g., FlowDroid [13],
CHEX [62]). Further, verification techniques gen-
erally require correctness to be specified, i.e., the
policies or invariants that the program is checked
against. Concretely defining what is “correct” is
hard even for high-level program behavior (e.g.,
making a “correct” SSL connection), and may be in-
feasible for complex static analysis tools (e.g., de-
tecting “all incorrect SSL connections”). µSE does
not aim to substitute formal verification of static
analysis tools; instead, it aims to uncover existing
limitations of such tools.
Mutation Analysis for Android: Deng et al.
[26] introduced mutation analysis for Android
and derived operators by analyzing the syntax of
Android-specific Java constructs. Subsequently, a
mutation analysis framework for Android (µDroid)
has been introduced to evaluate a test suite’s abil-
ity to uncover energy bugs [49]. µSE incorporates
concepts from the general mutation analysis pro-
posed by prior work (especially on Android [49,
26, 58]), but adapts them in the context of secu-
rity. We design mSE to focus on undetected mu-
tants, providing a semi-automated methodology
to resolve such mutants to design/implementation
flaws (Section 4.3). The derivation of security op-
erators (Section 4.1) represents a notable departure
from traditional mutation testing that seeds sim-
ple syntactic code changes. Our mutation schemes
(Section 4.2) evaluate coverage of OS-specific ab-
stractions, reachability of the analysis, or the abil-
ity to detect semantically-complex mutants, provid-
ing the expressibility necessary for security testing,
while building upon traditional approaches. Fur-
ther, µSE builds upon the software infrastructure
developed for MDROID+ [58] that allows a scalable
analysis of mutants seeded according to security
operators. In particular, µSE adapts the process of
deriving a potential fault profile for mutant injec-
tion and relies on the EE to validate the mutants
seeded according to our derived security operators.
Android Application Security Tools: The popular-
ity and open-source nature of Android has spurred
an immense amount of research related to exam-
ining and improving the security of the underly-
ing OS, SDK, and apps. Recently, Acar et al. have
systematized Android security research [9], and we
discuss work that introduces static analysis-based
countermeasures for Android security issues ac-
cording to Acar et al.’s categorization.
Perhaps the most prevalent area of research in
Android security has concerned the permissions
system that mediates access to privileged hardware
and software resources. Several approaches have
motivated changes to Android’s permission model,
or have proposed enhancements to it, with goals
ranging from detecting or fixing unauthorized in-
formation disclosure or leaks in third party appli-
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cations [33, 13, 42, 70, 69, 94, 52] to detecting over-
privilege in applications [37, 14, 92]. Similarly, prior
work has also focused on benign but vulnerable
Android applications, and proposed techniques to
detect or fix vulnerabilities such as cryptographic
API misuse API [35, 32, 87, 36] or unprotected ap-
plication interfaces [38, 22, 54]. Moreover, these
techniques have often been deployed as modifica-
tions to Android’s permission enforcement [34, 33,
72, 40, 29, 38, 18, 76, 23, 100, 86, 19, 46, 77, 83, 81],
SDK tools [37, 14, 92], or inline reference moni-
tors [93, 51, 24, 17, 16]. While this paper demon-
strates the evaluation of only a small subset of these
tools with µSE, our experiments demonstrate that
µSE has the potential to impact nearly all of them.
For instance, µSE could be applied to further vet
SSL analysis tools by purposely introducing com-
plex SSL errors in real applications, or tools that
analyze overprivilege or permission misuse, by de-
veloping security operators that attempt to misuse
permissions to circumvent such monitors. Future
work may use µSE to perform an in-depth analysis
of these problems.
9 Limitations
1) Soundness of µSE: As acknowledged in Sec-
tion 8, mSE does not aim to supplant formal ver-
ification (which would be sound), and does not
claim soundness guarantees. Rather, mSE provides
a systematic approach to semi-automatically un-
cover flaws in existing security tools, which is a sig-
nificant advancement over manually-curated tests.
2) Manual Effort: Presently, the workflow of µSE
requires an analyst to manually analyze the result
of µSE (i.e., uncaught mutants). However, as de-
scribed in Section 6.2, µSE possesses enhancements
that mitigate the manual effort by dynamically
eliminating non-executable mutants, that would
otherwise impose a burden on the analyst exam-
ining undetected mutants. In our experience, this
analysis was completed in a reasonable time using
the methodology outlined in Section 4.3.
3) Limitations of Execution Engine: Like any dy-
namic analysis tool, the EE will not explore all pos-
sible program states, thus, there may be a set of
mutants marked as non-executable by the EE, that
may actually be executable under certain scenarios.
However, the CRASHSCOPE tool, which µSE’s’s EE is
based upon, has been shown to perform compara-
bly to other tools in terms of coverage [66]. Future
versions of µSE’s EE could rely on emerging input
generation tools for Android apps [64].
10 Conclusion
We proposed the µSE framework for performing
systematic security evaluation of Android static
analysis tools to discover (undocumented) un-
sound assumptions, adopting the practice of mu-
tation testing from SE to security. µSE not only de-
tected major flaws in a popular, open-source An-
droid security tool, but also demonstrated how
these flaws propagated to other tools that inherited
the security tool in question. With µSE, we demon-
strated how mutation analysis can be feasibly used
for gleaning unsound assumptions in existing tools,
benefiting developers, researchers, and end users,
by making such tools more secure and transparent.
11 Acknowledgements
We thank Rozda Askari for his help with setting up
experiments. We thank the FlowDroid developers,
as well as the developers of the other tools we eval-
uate in this paper, for making their tools available to
the community, providing us with the necessary in-
formation for our analysis, and being open to sug-
gestions and improvements. The authors have been
supported in part by the NSF-1815336, NSF-714581
and NSF-714161 grants. Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions expressed herein are the authors’
and do not necessarily reflect those of the sponsors.
References
[1] Android developer documentation - broadcasts
https://developer.android.com/guide/
components/broadcasts.html.
[2] Android developer documentation - intents and intent
filters https://developer.android.com/guide/
components/intents-filters.html.
[3] Android developer documentation - the activity
lifecycle https://developer.android.com/
guide/components/activities/activity-
lifecycle.html.
[4] Apache ant build system - http://ant.apache.org.
[5] F-droid.https://f-droid.org/.
[6] Gradle build system - https://gradle.org.
[7] Soot java instrumentation framework http://sable.
github.io/soot/.
[8] AAFER, Y., ZHANG, N., ZHANG, Z., ZHANG, X., CHEN,
K., WANG, X., ZHOU, X., DU, W., AND GRACE, M. Hare
hunting in the wild android: A study on the threat of
hanging attribute references. In Proceedings of the 22Nd
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (New York, NY, USA, 2015), CCS ’15, ACM,
pp. 1248–1259.
[9] ACAR, Y., BACKES, M., BUGIEL, S., FAHL, S., MC-
DANIEL, P., AND SMITH, M. Sok: Lessons learned from
android security research for appified software platforms.
In 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P ’16)
(2016), IEEE.
14
[10] ANDROID DEVELOPERS. Fragments. https:
//developer.android.com/guide/components/
fragments.html.
[11] APPELT, D., NGUYEN, C. D., BRIAND, L. C., AND AL-
SHAHWAN, N. Automated testing for SQL injection vul-
nerabilities: an input mutation approach. In International
Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis, ISSTA ’14, San
Jose, CA, USA - July 21 - 26, 2014 (2014), pp. 259–269.
[12] ARP, D., SPREITZENBARTH, M., HU¨BNER, M., GASCON,
H., AND RIECK, K. DREBIN: Effective and Explainable
Detection of Android Malware in Your Pocket. In Proceed-
ings of the ISOC Network and Distributed Systems Symposium
(NDSS) (Feb. 2014).
[13] ARZT, S., RASTHOFER, S., FRITZ, C., BODDEN, E., BAR-
TEL, A., KLEIN, J., LE TRAON, Y., OCTEAU, D., AND
MCDANIEL, P. FlowDroid: Precise Context, Flow, Field,
Object-sensitive and Lifecycle-aware Taint Analysis for
Android Apps. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Con-
ference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
(PLDI) (2014).
[14] AU, K. W. Y., ZHOU, Y. F., HUANG, Z., AND LIE, D.
PScout: Analyzing the Android Permission Specification.
In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and
communications security (2012), pp. 217–228.
[15] AVDIIENKO, V., KUZNETSOV, K., GORLA, A., ZELLER,
A., ARZT, S., RASTHOFER, S., AND BODDEN, E. Mining
apps for abnormal usage of sensitive data. In Proceedings
of the 37th International Conference on Software Engineering-
Volume 1 (May 2015), pp. 426–436.
[16] BACKES, M., BUGIEL, S., HAMMER, C., SCHRANZ, O.,
AND VON STYP-REKOWSKY, P. Boxify: Full-fledged App
Sandboxing for Stock Android. In 24th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security 15) (Aug. 2015).
[17] BACKES, M., GERLING, S., HAMMER, C., MAFFEI, M.,
AND VON STYP-REKOWSKY, P. AppGuard: Enforcing
User Requirements on Android Apps. In Proceedings of
the International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS) (2013).
[18] BUGIEL, S., DAVI, L., DMITRIENKO, A., FISCHER, T.,
SADEGHI, A.-R., AND SHASTRY, B. Toward Taming
Privilege-Escalation Attacks on Android. In Proceedings
of the ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Sympo-
sium (NDSS) (2012).
[19] BUGIEL, S., DAVI, L., DMITRIENKO, A., HEUSER, S.,
SADEGHI, A.-R., AND SHASTRY, B. Practical and
Lightweight Domain Isolation on Android. In Proceedings
of the ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Mobile De-
vices (SPSM) (2011).
[20] CALZAVARA, S., GRISHCHENKO, I., AND MAFFEI, M.
HornDroid: Practical and Sound Static Analysis of An-
droid Applications by SMT Solving. In 2016 IEEE Euro-
pean Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P) (March
2016), pp. 47–62.
[21] CAO, Y., FRATANTONIO, Y., BIANCHI, A., EGELE, M.,
KRUEGEL, C., VIGNA, G., AND CHEN, Y. EdgeMiner: Au-
tomatically Detecting Implicit Control Flow Transitions
through the Android Framework. In Proceedings of the
ISOC Network and Distributed Systems Symposium (NDSS)
(Feb. 2015).
[22] CHIN, E., FELT, A. P., GREENWOOD, K., AND WAGNER,
D. Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in An-
droid. In Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Confer-
ence on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services (MobiSys)
(2011).
[23] CONTI, M., NGUYEN, V. T. N., AND CRISPO, B. CRePE:
Context-Related Policy Enforcement for Android. In Pro-
ceedings of the 13th Information Security Conference (ISC)
(Oct. 2010).
[24] DAVIS, B., SANDERS, B., KHODAVERDIAN, A., AND
CHEN, H. I-arm-droid: A rewriting framework for in-app
reference monitors for android applications.
[25] DEMILLO, R. A., LIPTON, R. J., AND SAYWARD, F. G.
Hints on test data selection: Help for the practicing pro-
grammer. Computer 11, 4 (April 1978), 34–41.
[26] DENG, L., MIRZAEI, N., AMMANN, P., AND OFFUTT, J.
Towards mutation analysis of android apps. In Software
Testing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW), 2015
IEEE Eighth International Conference on (April 2015), pp. 1–
10.
[27] DEREZIN´SKA, A., AND HAŁAS, K. Analysis of Mutation
Operators for the Python Language. Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 2014, pp. 155–164.
[28] DI NARDO, D., PASTORE, F., AND BRIAND, L. C. Gener-
ating complex and faulty test data through model-based
mutation analysis. In 8th IEEE International Conference on
Software Testing, Verification and Validation, ICST 2015, Graz,
Austria, April 13-17, 2015 (2015), pp. 1–10.
[29] DIETZ, M., SHEKHAR, S., PISETSKY, Y., SHU, A., AND
WALLACH, D. S. Quire: Lightweight Provenance for
Smart Phone Operating Systems. In Proceedings of the
USENIX Security Symposium (Aug. 2011).
[30] DOLAN-GAVITT, B., HULIN, P., KIRDA, E., LEEK, T.,
MAMBRETTI, A., ROBERTSON, W., ULRICH, F., AND
WHELAN, R. Lava: Large-scale automated vulnerability
addition. In Proceedings of the 37th IEEE Symposium on Se-
curity and Privacy (S&P) (may 2016).
[31] ECONOMIST, T. Planet of the phones. http:
//www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645180-
smartphone-ubiquitous-addictive-and-
transformative-planet-phones, Feb. 2015.
[32] EGELE, M., BRUMLEY, D., FRATANTONIO, Y., AND
KRUEGEL, C. An Empirical Study of Cryptographic Mis-
use in Android Applications. In Proceedings of the 2013
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications
Security (2013).
[33] ENCK, W., GILBERT, P., CHUN, B.-G., COX, L. P., JUNG,
J., MCDANIEL, P., AND SHETH, A. N. TaintDroid: An
Information-Flow Tracking System for Realtime Privacy
Monitoring on Smartphones. In Proceedings of the 9th
USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Im-
plementation (OSDI) (Oct. 2010).
[34] ENCK, W., ONGTANG, M., AND MCDANIEL, P. On
Lightweight Mobile Phone Application Certification. In
Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS) (Nov. 2009).
[35] FAHL, S., HARBACH, M., MUDERS, T., BAUMGA¨RTNER,
L., FREISLEBEN, B., AND SMITH, M. Why eve and mal-
lory love android: An analysis of android ssl (in)security.
In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (2012).
[36] FAHL, S., HARBACH, M., PERL, H., KOETTER, M., AND
SMITH, M. Rethinking SSL Development in an Appified
World. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer &#38; Communications Security (New York,
NY, USA, 2013), CCS ’13, ACM, pp. 49–60.
15
[37] FELT, A. P., CHIN, E., HANNA, S., SONG, D., AND WAG-
NER, D. Android Permissions Demystified. In Proceedings
of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity (CCS) (2011).
[38] FELT, A. P., WANG, H. J., MOSHCHUK, A., HANNA, S.,
AND CHIN, E. Permission Re-Delegation: Attacks and De-
fenses. In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium
(Aug. 2011).
[39] FENGGUO WEI, SANKARDAS ROY, X. O., AND ROBBY.
Amandroid: A Precise and General Inter-component Data
Flow Analysis Framework for Security Vetting of Android
Apps. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS) (Nov. 2014).
[40] FRAGKAKI, E., BAUER, L., JIA, L., AND SWASEY, D. Mod-
eling and enhancing android’s permission system. In
Computer Security – ESORICS 2012 (Berlin, Heidelberg,
2012), S. Foresti, M. Yung, and F. Martinelli, Eds., Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 1–18.
[41] FRANKLIN, J., CHAKI, S., DATTA, A., AND SESHADRI, A.
Scalable parametric verification of secure systems: How
to verify reference monitors without worrying about data
structure size. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 IEEE Sym-
posium on (2010), pp. 365–379.
[42] GIBLER, C., CRUSSELL, J., ERICKSON, J., AND CHEN, H.
AndroidLeaks: Automatically Detecting Potential Privacy
Leaks In Android Applications on a Large Scale. In Pro-
ceedings of the International Conference on Trust and Trustwor-
thy Computing (TRUST) (June 2012).
[43] GORDON, M. I., KIM, D., PERKINS, J., GILHAM, L.,
NGUYEN, N., AND RINARD, M. Information Flow Anal-
ysis of Android Applications in DroidSafe. In Proceed-
ings of the ISOC Network and Distributed Systems Symposium
(NDSS) (Feb. 2015).
[44] GRACE, M., ZHOU, Y., ZHANG, Q., ZOU, S., AND JIANG,
X. RiskRanker: Scalable and Accurate Zero-day Android
Malware Detection. In Proceedings of the International Con-
ference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services (Mo-
biSys) (2012).
[45] HAMLET, R. G. Testing programs with the aid of a com-
piler. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 3, 4 (July 1977), 279–290.
[46] HEUSER, S., NADKARNI, A., ENCK, W., AND SADEGHI,
A.-R. ASM: A Programmable Interface for Extending An-
droid Security. In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Sym-
posium (Aug. 2014).
[47] HO, T.-H., DEAN, D., GU, X., AND ENCK, W. PREC:
Practical Root Exploit Containment for Android Devices.
In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Conference on Data and Ap-
plication Security and Privacy (CODASPY) (Mar. 2014).
[48] HOLAVANALLI, S., MANUEL, D., NANJUNDASWAMY, V.,
ROSENBERG, B., SHEN, F., KO, S. Y., AND ZIAREK, L.
Flow permissions for android. In 2013 28th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering
(ASE) (Nov 2013), pp. 652–657.
[49] JABBARVAND, R., AND MALEK, S. mudroid: An energy-
aware mutation testing framework for android. In Proceed-
ings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software
Engineering (New York, NY, USA, 2017), ESEC/FSE 2017,
ACM, pp. 208–219.
[50] JAMROZIK, K., VON STYP-REKOWSKY, P., AND ZELLER,
A. Mining sandboxes. In Software Engineering (ICSE), 2016
IEEE/ACM 38th International Conference on (May 2016),
pp. 37–48.
[51] JEON, J., MICINSKI, K. K., VAUGHAN, J. A., FOGEL, A.,
REDDY, N., FOSTER, J. S., AND MILLSTEIN, T. Dr. An-
droid and Mr. Hide: Fine-grained Permissions in Android
Applications. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Secu-
rity and Privacy in Mobile Devices (SPSM) (2012).
[52] JIA, L., ALJURAIDAN, J., FRAGKAKI, E., BAUER, L.,
STROUCKEN, M., FUKUSHIMA, K., KIYOMOTO, S., AND
MIYAKE, Y. Run-Time Enforcement of Information-Flow
Properties on Android (Extended Abstract). In Proceedings
of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
(ESORICS) (Sept. 2013).
[53] KLIEBER, W., FLYNN, L., BHOSALE, A., JIA, L., AND
BAUER, L. Android Taint Flow Analysis for App Sets. In
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGPLAN International Work-
shop on the State of the Art in Java Program Analysis (2014),
pp. 1–6.
[54] LEE, Y. K., BANG, J. Y., SAFI, G., SHAHBAZIAN, A.,
ZHAO, Y., AND MEDVIDOVIC, N. A sealant for inter-app
security holes in android. In Proceedings of the 39th In-
ternational Conference on Software Engineering (May 2017),
pp. 312–323.
[55] LI, L., BARTEL, A., BISSYANDE´, T. F., KLEIN, J.,
LE TRAON, Y., ARZT, S., RASTHOFER, S., BODDEN, E.,
OCTEAU, D., AND MCDANIEL, P. Iccta: Detecting inter-
component privacy leaks in android apps. In Proceedings
of the 37th International Conference on Software Engineering -
Volume 1 (2015), pp. 280–291.
[56] LI, L., BARTEL, A., KLEIN, J., AND TRAON, Y. L. Auto-
matically exploiting potential component leaks in android
applications. In 2014 IEEE 13th International Conference on
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communica-
tions (Sept 2014), pp. 388–397.
[57] LILLACK, M., KASTNER, C., AND BODDEN, E. Tracking
load-time configuration options. IEEE Transactions on Soft-
ware Engineering PP, 99 (2017), 1–1.
[58] LINARES-VA´SQUEZ, M., BAVOTA, G., TUFANO, M.,
MORAN, K., DI PENTA, M., VENDOME, C., BERNAL-
CA´RDENAS, C., AND POSHYVANYK, D. Enabling muta-
tion testing for android apps. In Proceedings of the 2017 11th
Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering (New
York, NY, USA, 2017), ESEC/FSE 2017, ACM, pp. 233–244.
[59] LINDORFER, M., NEUGSCHWANDTNER, M., WEICHSEL-
BAUM, L., FRATANTONIO, Y., VAN DER VEEN, V., AND
PLATZER, C. Andrubis–1,000,000 apps later: A view on
current Android malware behaviors. In Third International
Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering Expe-
rience Returns for Security (BADGERS) (2014).
[60] LIU, B., LIU, B., JIN, H., AND GOVINDAN, R. Efficient
privilege de-escalation for ad libraries in mobile apps. In
Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Conference on
Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services (New York, NY,
USA, 2015), MobiSys ’15, ACM, pp. 89–103.
[61] LIVSHITS, B., SRIDHARAN, M., SMARAGDAKIS, Y.,
LHOTA´K, O., AMARAL, J. N., CHANG, B.-Y. E., GUYER,
S. Z., KHEDKER, U. P., MØLLER, A., AND VARDOULAKIS,
D. In defense of soundiness: A manifesto. Commun. ACM
58, 2 (Jan. 2015).
[62] LU, L., LI, Z., WU, Z., LEE, W., AND JIANG, G. CHEX:
Statically Vetting Android Apps for Component Hijack-
ing Vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the ACM Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (2012),
pp. 229–240.
16
[63] MA, Y., KWON, Y. R., AND OFFUTT, J. Inter-class muta-
tion operators for java. In 13th International Symposium on
Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE 2002), 12-15 Novem-
ber 2002, Annapolis, MD, USA (2002), pp. 352–366.
[64] MAO, K., HARMAN, M., AND JIA, Y. Sapienz: Multi-
objective automated testing for android applications. In
Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on Software
Testing and Analysis (New York, NY, USA, 2016), ISSTA
2016, ACM, pp. 94–105.
[65] MORAN, K., LINARES-VASQUEZ, M., BERNAL-
CARDENAS, C., VENDOME, C., AND POSHYVANYK,
D. Crashscope: A practical tool for automated testing of
android applications. In 2017 IEEE/ACM 39th International
Conference on Software Engineering Companion (ICSE-C)
(May 2017), pp. 15–18.
[66] MORAN, K., VA´SQUEZ, M. L., BERNAL-CA´RDENAS, C.,
VENDOME, C., AND POSHYVANYK, D. Automatically dis-
covering, reporting and reproducing android application
crashes. In 2016 IEEE International Conference on Software
Testing, Verification and Validation, ICST 2016, Chicago, IL,
USA, April 11-15, 2016 (2016), pp. 33–44.
[67] MYERS, A. C. JFlow: Practical Mostly-Static Informa-
tion Flow Control. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium
on Principles of Programming Langauges (POPL) (January
1999).
[68] MYERS, A. C., AND LISKOV, B. Protecting Privacy Us-
ing the Decentralized Label Model. ACM Transactions on
Software Engineering and Methodology 9, 4 (October 2000),
410–442.
[69] NADKARNI, A., ANDOW, B., ENCK, W., AND JHA, S.
Practical difc enforcement on android. In 25th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16) (Aug. 2016).
[70] NADKARNI, A., AND ENCK, W. Preventing Accidental
Data Disclosure in Modern Operating Systems. In Proceed-
ings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS) (Nov. 2013).
[71] NAN, Y., YANG, M., YANG, Z., ZHOU, S., GU, G., AND
WANG, X. Uipicker: User-input privacy identification
in mobile applications. In USENIX Security Symposium
(2015), pp. 993–1008.
[72] NAUMAN, M., KHAN, S., AND ZHANG, X. Apex: Extend-
ing Android Permission Model and Enforcement with
User-defined Runtime Constraints. In Proceedings of the
ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communica-
tions Security (ASIACCS) (2010).
[73] OCTEAU, D., LUCHAUP, D., DERING, M., JHA, S., AND
MCDANIEL, P. Composite constant propagation: Appli-
cation to android inter-component communication analy-
sis. In Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Soft-
ware Engineering - Volume 1 (Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2015),
ICSE ’15, IEEE Press, pp. 77–88.
[74] OFFUTT, A. J., AND UNTCH, R. H. Mutation 2000: Uniting
the Orthogonal. Springer US, Boston, MA, 2001, pp. 34–44.
[75] OLIVEIRA, R. A. P., ALE´GROTH, E., GAO, Z., AND
MEMON, A. Definition and evaluation of mutation op-
erators for GUI-level mutation analysis. In International
Conference on Software Testing, Verification, and Validation -
Workshops, ICSTW’15 (2015), pp. 1–10.
[76] ONGTANG, M., MCLAUGHLIN, S., ENCK, W., AND MC-
DANIEL, P. Semantically Rich Application-Centric Secu-
rity in Android. In Proceedings of the 25th Annual Com-
puter Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) (Dec. 2009),
pp. 340–349.
[77] PEARCE, P., FELT, A. P., NUNEZ, G., AND WAGNER, D.
AdDroid: Privilege Separation for Applications and Ad-
vertisers in Android. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium
on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASI-
ACCS) (2012).
[78] PRAPHAMONTRIPONG, U., OFFUTT, J., DENG, L., AND
GU, J. An experimental evaluation of web mutation oper-
ators. In International Conference on Software Testing, Verifi-
cation, and Validation, ICSTW’16 (2016), pp. 102–111.
[79] RASTHOFER, S., ARZT, S., LOVAT, E., AND BODDEN, E.
Droidforce: Enforcing complex, data-centric, system-wide
policies in android. In 2014 Ninth International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security (Sept 2014), pp. 40–
49.
[80] RASTOGI, V., CHEN, Y., AND ENCK, W. AppsPlayground:
Automatic Large-scale Dynamic Analysis of Android Ap-
plications. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY) (Feb. 2013).
[81] ROESNER, F., AND KOHNO, T. Securing embedded user
interfaces: Android and beyond. In Presented as part of
the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 13)
(2013).
[82] SASNAUSKAS, R., AND REGEHR, J. Intent fuzzer: Craft-
ing intents of death. In Proceedings of the 2014 Joint Interna-
tional Workshop on Dynamic Analysis (WODA) and Software
and System Performance Testing, Debugging, and Analytics
(PERTEA) (New York, NY, USA, 2014), WODA+PERTEA
2014, ACM, pp. 1–5.
[83] SHEKHAR, S., DIETZ, M., AND WALLACH, D. S. Ad-
Split: Separating Smartphone Advertising from Applica-
tions. In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium
(2012).
[84] SHEN, F., VISHNUBHOTLA, N., TODARKA, C., ARORA,
M., DHANDAPANI, B., KO, S. Y., AND ZIAREK, L. Infor-
mation Flows as a Permission Mechanism. In Proceedings
of the IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Soft-
ware Engineering (ASE) (2014).
[85] SLAVIN, R., WANG, X., HOSSEINI, M. B., HESTER, J., KR-
ISHNAN, R., BHATIA, J., BREAUX, T. D., AND NIU, J. To-
ward a framework for detecting privacy policy violations
in android application code. In Proceedings of the 38th Inter-
national Conference on Software Engineering (New York, NY,
USA, 2016), ICSE ’16, ACM, pp. 25–36.
[86] SMALLEY, S., AND CRAIG, R. Security Enhanced (SE)
Android: Bringing Flexible MAC to Android. In Proceed-
ings of the ISOC Network and Distributed Systems Symposium
(NDSS) (2013).
[87] SOUNTHIRARAJ, D., SAHS, J., LIN, Z., KHAN, L., AND
GREENWOOD, G. SMV-Hunter: Large Scale, Automated
Detection of SSL/TLS Man-in-the-Middle Vulnerabilities
in Android Apps. In Proceedings of the ISOC Network and
Distributed Systems Symposium (NDSS) (Feb. 2014).
[88] STEVEN ARTZ. FlowDroid 2.0. https://github.
com/secure-software-engineering/soot-
infoflow/releases.
[89] µSE DEVELOPERS. µSE sources and data. https://
muse-security-evaluation.github.io.
[90] VALLE´E-RAI, R., CO, P., GAGNON, E., HENDREN, L.,
LAM, P., AND SUNDARESAN, V. Soot-a java bytecode op-
timization framework. In Proceedings of the 1999 conference
of the Centre for Advanced Studies on Collaborative research
(1999), IBM Press, p. 13.
17
[91] VASUDEVAN, A., CHAKI, S., JIA, L., MCCUNE, J., NEW-
SOME, J., AND DATTA, A. Design, implementation
and verification of an extensible and modular hypervisor
framework. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Sympo-
sium on (2013), pp. 430–444.
[92] VIDAS, T., CRISTIN, N., AND CRANOR, L. F. Curbing
Android Permission Creep. In Proceedings of the Workshop
on Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP) (2011).
[93] XU, R., SAIDI, H., AND ANDERSON, R. Aurasium: Practi-
cal Policy Enforcement for Android Applications. In Pro-
ceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium (2012).
[94] XU, Y., AND WITCHEL, E. Maxoid: transparently confin-
ing mobile applications with custom views of state. In Pro-
ceedings of the Tenth European Conference on Computer Sys-
tems (2015), ACM, p. 26.
[95] YANG, J., YESSENOV, K., AND SOLAR-LEZAMA, A. A
Language for Automatically Enforcing Privacy Policies.
In Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (2012).
[96] YANG, W., XIAO, X., ANDOW, B., LI, S., XIE, T., AND
ENCK, W. Appcontext: Differentiating malicious and
benign mobile app behaviors using context. In 2015
IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE International Conference on Software
Engineering (May 2015), vol. 1, pp. 303–313.
[97] ZHOU, C., AND FRANKL, P. G. Mutation testing for java
database applications. In Second International Conference on
Software Testing Verification and Validation, ICST 2009, Den-
ver, Colorado, USA, April 1-4, 2009 (2009), pp. 396–405.
[98] ZHOU, Y., AND JIANG, X. Dissecting Android Malware:
Characterization and Evolution. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland) (2012).
[99] ZHOU, Y., WANG, Z., ZHOU, W., AND JIANG, X. Hey,
You, Get off of My Market: Detecting Malicious Apps in
Official and Alternative Android Markets. In Proceedings
of the ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Sympo-
sium (NDSS) (Feb. 2012).
[100] ZHOU, Y., ZHANG, X., JIANG, X., AND FREEH, V. W.
Taming Information-Stealing Smartphone Applications
(on Android). In Proceedings of the International Conference
on Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST) (June 2011).
A Fragment Use Study
We performed a small-scale app study using the
Soot [7] static analysis library to deduce how com-
monly fragments were used in real apps. That is,
we analyzed 240 top apps from every category on
Google Play (i.e., a total of 8,664 apps collected as of
June 2017 after removing duplicates), and observed
that at least 4,273 apps (49.3%) used fragments in
their main application code, while an additional
3,587 (41.4%) used fragments in packaged libraries.
Note that while we did not execute the apps to de-
termine if the fragment code was really executed,
the fact that 7,860 out of 8,664 top apps, or 91% of
popular apps contain fragment code indicates the
possibility that fragments are widely used, and that
accidental or malicious data leaks in a large number
of apps could evade FlowDroid due to this flaw.
1 BroadcastReceiver receiver = new BroadcastReceiver()
{
2 @Override
3 public void onReceive(Context context, Intent
intent) {
4 BroadcastReceiver receiver = new
BroadcastReceiver(){
5 @Override
6 public void onReceive(Context context,
Intent intent) {
7 String dataLeak = Calendar.
getInstance().getTimeZone().
getDisplayName();
8 Log.d("leak-1", dataLeak);
9 }
10 };
11 IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter();
12 filter.addAction("android.intent.action.SEND");
13 registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
14 }};
15 IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter();
16 filter.addAction("android.intent.action.SEND");
17 registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
Listing 3: Dynamically created Broadcast Receiver,
created inside another, with data leak.
B Code Snippets
In Listing 3, we dynamically register a broadcast re-
ceiver inside another dynamically registered broad-
cast receiver, and add the mutant (i.e., a data leak in
this case) inside the onReceive() callback of the in-
ner broadcast receiver.
C CrashScope (Execution Engine)
The EE functions by statically analyzing the code
of a target app to identify activities implement-
ing potential contextual features (e.g., rotation, sen-
sor usage) via API call-chain propagation. It then
executes an app according to one of several ex-
ploration strategies while constructing a dynamic
event-flow model of an app in an online fashion.
These strategies are organized along three dimen-
sions: (i) GUI-exploration, (ii) text-entry, and (iii)
contextual features. The Execution Engine uses a
Depth-First Search (DFS) heuristic to systematically
explore the GUI, either starting from the top of
the screen down, or from the bottom of the screen
up. It is also able to dynamically infer the allow-
able text characters from the Android software key-
board and enter expected text or no text. Finally,
the EE can exercise contextual features (e.g., rota-
tion, simulating GPS coordinates). Since the goal of
the EE is to explore as many screens of a target app
as possible, the EE forgoes certain combinations of
exploration strategies from CRASHSCOPE (e.g., en-
tering unexpected text or disabling contextual fea-
tures) prone to eliciting crashes from apps. The ap-
proach utilizes adb and Android’s uiautomator
framework to interact with and extract GUI-related
information from a target device or emulator.
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